

'The gaze without eyes': video-surveillance and the changing nature of urban space

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Abstract: This article discusses how ever-increasing video-surveillance is changing the nature of urban space. The article evaluates whether surveillance can be seen as a means of making space safer and 'more available'. The main focus is on surveillance in publicly accessible spaces, such as shopping malls, city streets and places for public transport. The article explains how space under surveillance is formed, and how it is related to power structures and human emotions. Space is conceptualized from various viewpoints. Three concepts of space are postulated: space as a container, power-space and emotional space. The purpose is not to construct a meta-theory of space; rather, the concepts are used as 'tools' for exploring the issue of surveillance. It is argued that video-surveillance changes the ways in which power is exercised, modifies emotional experiences in urban space and affects the ways in which 'reality' is conceptualized and understood. Surveillance contributes to the production of urban space.

Key words: CCTV, cities, emotions, power relations, production of space, surveillance, urban planning

I Introduction

When Bentham designed the 'panopticon' in the eighteenth century, surveillance cameras were not available. Even when Foucault analysed the panopticon's social meanings, video-surveillance was not an issue. Yet the principle of video-surveillance is much the same as the principle of this 'ideal prison': to be seen but never to know when or by whom. The number of surveillance cameras and the amount of space under surveillance have grown massively in the recent decades. Through surveillance cameras the panoptic technology of power has been *electronically extended*, making our cities like enormous panopticons (for discussion see, for example, Cohen, 1985; Davis, 1990; Lyon, 1994; Oc and Tiesdell, 1997; Ainley, 1998; Fyfe and Bannister, 1998).

The purpose of this article is to discuss how increasing video-surveillance is changing

the nature of urban space. After describing aspects of how and where surveillance cameras are used, I focus on various dimensions of space. My purpose is to postulate theoretical space-concepts that can be used as 'tools' for analysing the question of surveillance. I conceptualize surveillance and space from three different angles. First, I consider how surveillance cameras as a technical solution to crime and fear of crime affect space, and how the basic *locations of things* can readily change the nature of space. Secondly, I describe how some of the *power-relationships* embedded within surveillance affect space. My aim is to produce a critical consideration of some of the complex relationships between power and space. I also consider whether the questions of surveillance are related to gender. Thirdly, I discuss what kind of *emotions and feelings* surveillance creates and assess how these emotions shape space.

In much of the research, the role of surveillance technology has been perceived either overoptimistically (embracing the prospect that all social improvement is technology-driven) or overpessimistically (believing that all surveillance leads to totalitarianism). As Lyon (1994) has argued, the latter discussion quickly relapses into paranoia, where surveillance is viewed monolithically as a threat. While my aim is to produce a critical conceptualization of video-surveillance, I try to avoid reproducing a form of analysis that would only yield dystopian images of totalitarian power. I examine surveillance as it is executed by surveillance cameras in cities: speed control cameras on roads as well as other forms of electronic surveillance and information retrieval – geographical information systems, databases of creditworthiness, 'data profiling', tracing users in cyberspace, etc. (see, for example, Lyon, 1994; Burrows, 1997; Curry, 1997; Hannah, 1997b; Graham, 1998) – are left to one side. My interest here is in the *spatial nature of video-surveillance*.

II Defence and exclusion: towards safer cities?

One reason for the popularity of video-surveillance in contemporary cities is its ease and presumed effectiveness. Compared to patrolling by foot, video-surveillance makes it possible to oversee larger spaces with the same amount of personnel and, therefore, new surveillance technologies are usually greatly appreciated, for example, by the police (Koskela and Tuominen, 1995). Electronic means are beginning to replace informal social control in urban environments: *the eyes* of the people *on the street* are replaced by the eyes of surveillance cameras (cf. Jacobs, 1961; see also Oc and Tiesdell, 1997; Fyfe and Bannister, 1998; Fyfe *et al.*, 1998). At the same time, the nature of urban space is changing; space is becoming more defended – or 'defensible'. The basic idea of crime-reducing 'defensible space' was to employ architectural design to enable informal surveillance by people; electronic equipment was used only when physical redesign was not possible and video-surveillance was 'the only resource open' (Newman, 1972: 182). However, we are now in a situation where electronic surveillance seems to be the first and easiest option and it is accepted with relatively little critical discussion. The ostensible aim of this massive surveillance has been to make cities safer, and thus more available to everyone. My purpose here, therefore, is to discuss whether surveillance really can be seen as a means of making space more available.

1 Excluding strangers versus ensuring security

Surveillance has become common in various spaces – in private premises as well as in semi-public and public spaces. Surveillance cameras are commonly used to protect high-class private premises – ‘gated communities’ (e.g., Flusty, 1994; Blakely and Snyder, 1997) – but also semi-public places such as shopping malls (Shields, 1989; Crawford, 1992; Judd, 1995), underground and mainline train-stations (Koskela and Tuominen, 1995), police stations (*Edinburgh Evening News*, 5 May 1997) and even churches (*Helsingin Sanomat*, 14 June 1998). Increasingly, surveillance is being used to monitor city streets.

In this article the main focus is on surveillance in *publicly accessible urban spaces*, such as shopping malls, city streets and places for public transport. Some of these are owned privately, some publicly, but the common attribute is that they are, at least in principle, accessible to everyone. In these spaces surveillance has emerged as a means of reducing crime and the fear of crime. It not only aims to protect property but also tries to reduce violence and to achieve better safety and inviolability for people. Indeed, in European countries surveillance has become most common in publicly accessible spaces. Britain is said to have the greatest amount of closed circuit television surveillance (CCTV)¹ of public space in the capitalist world (Graham *et al.*, 1996, quoted in Fyfe and Bannister, 1998). This, as Fyfe and Bannister (1998: 257) argue, is not the result of an evaluation of the effectiveness of surveillance but, rather a solution to crime which ‘fits with a wider economic and political agenda to do with the contemporary restructuring of urban public space’. In Scandinavia, Finland has the highest number of surveillance cameras (Takala, 1998). It has been estimated that Britain and Finland have the most intensive surveillance among the member countries of the European Union (Takala, 1998:33) but, in both these countries, the degree of regulation of surveillance is very low.

In addition, surveillance has a wider context. Companies in Britain and other western European countries, such as France and Germany, are involved in international trade in surveillance technology, which includes sales to countries with nondemocratic regimes (*Privacy International*, 1995). Surveillance is used to protect the territoriality of the state (cf. Taylor, 1994; 1995). The state can use surveillance both to control access to its territory and to resist unwanted political activity inside its boundaries: this could be called the *political geography of surveillance*. In Finland the rise in surveillance can be seen as a reflection of the changing atmosphere of international relations in that the collapse of the USSR has influenced the Finnish security business. The media are promulgating the threat of the ‘Russian mafia’, and the police are tempted to reinforce this image. Training courses for security guards are marketed as a way of entering the Russian employment market as well as a way of obtaining employment with those Finnish companies which, it is claimed, need increased protection. At the same time, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is preparing educational guidelines and new legislation to regulate and standardize the security business (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1998).

2 Policing consumption

Video-surveillance has become particularly common in spaces of consumption: shopping malls, the main shopping areas of city centres and inside individual shops. Shopping malls in particular often have an extremely high level of surveillance. They

have become an essentially contradictory space – ‘space suggesting an openness that is in fact carefully exclusive’ (Marcuse, 1997: 107). Malls are often privately owned, and most video-surveillance systems are operated by private security firms. Surveillance here has become ‘policing for profit’, and not for safety (South, 1988).

In shopping malls surveillance is easy to use to exclude groups that are marginal in relation to the mall’s purpose. The guards’ routine work is to use surveillance cameras to look for ‘undesirables’ (Sibley, 1995: xi). The reason for excluding someone is that person’s appearance. A person’s appearance is considered as reflecting that person’s ability to consume (Crawford, 1992: 27): one must always look as if one has bought something or is about to buy (Shields, 1989: 160), because presumed noncustomers (such as bag ladies, the homeless or teenagers) ‘will be asked to move on or will be thrown out’ (Judd, 1995: 149). The spaces of consumption become ‘aestheticized’ by exclusion (Duncan, 1996: 129), and the urban experience is ‘purified’ (Sibley, 1995: 78). A shopping mall is like a prison reversed: deviant behaviour is restrained outside (Mäenpää, 1993: 29). Thus, ostensibly public spaces are not public for everyone – public space can be seen as if it ‘refers to places under public scrutiny’ (Domosh, 1998: 209). ‘The public’ is eroding.

Much of this has, until now, been going on in the restricted spaces of the malls. However, in Britain, for example, one reason for cities to install CCTV systems in their centres has been an attempt to *match* the level of safety the out-of-town business parks and shopping malls have been able to offer (Fyfe and Bannister, 1998; see also Brown, 1995; Fyfe *et al.*, 1998). Shopping malls have, in this sense, become *icons* for urban space. While increased safety is a possible benefit of this development, there are other consequences. The ‘erosion’ of public space will increasingly spread from malls to open publicly owned urban space. The controlled spaces which ‘signal exclusion’ (Sibley, 1995: 85) will no longer be restricted to particular private premises. And this is likely to change the nature of urban space.

3 Solutions for a better quality of life?

Despite all the policing with surveillance cameras, there is little agreement among researchers about whether surveillance cameras actually reduce crime (Fyfe and Bannister, 1998; Takala, 1998). Studies on surveillance have produced contradictory results. There is evidence that surveillance causes the ‘displacement’ of crime since, whereas the areas under surveillance become safer, the areas not covered by cameras become more dangerous (Tilley, 1993; Fyfe and Bannister, 1996). Sometimes, however, cameras can ‘spread’ their influence so that crime rates are reduced both in areas under surveillance and in the surrounding areas (Poyner, 1992; Brown, 1995). Studies suggest that the use of cameras has reduced property crime such as criminal damage, vehicle crime, theft and burglary (Brown, 1995; Fyfe and Bannister, 1996). There is much less evidence to show that cameras would reduce *violent crime*, such as battery and sexual violence. Sexual offences, in particular, are most common in places that are rarely monitored, such as parks, suburban areas and private space (Poyner, 1983). Consequently, in relation to property crime, the gains of surveillance are quite obvious but, in relation to violent crime, they are less so.

An unwanted outcome of trying to guarantee as low a crime rate as possible is that it

leads easily to ever-increasing surveillance and such solutions to reducing the crime rate can make the city a *less pleasant* place to live in rather than a more pleasant place. In extreme cases, the massive expansion of protection has been claimed to lead to a vicious circle of defence: while increasing security might make some people feel safer, it also creates increasing fear, racist paranoia and distrust among people (e.g., Davis, 1990; Ellin, 1996; 1997). This development has crystallized in cities such as Los Angeles, which has been considered to be to as the ultimate product of defensible fortress-like architecture (e.g., Jameson, 1991; Davis, 1992; Soja, 1989, 1996). It is claimed that the street environments have become 'sadistic'; that public space is difficult to approach and stay in; and that the natural social life of public space has ended: 'the streets are dead' (Davis, 1990: 230–32; see also Mitchell, 1995).²

The difference surveillance makes could mean, for example, that cities will move closer to the 'absolute predictability' of shopping malls (Judd, 1995: 149), that public space – or at least spontaneous social behaviour in it – will be forced to 'die' or that distrust, doubt and ambiguity will increasingly be the dominant feelings experienced in such space. To achieve a better understanding of this, we must look closer at space. By this I do not mean an analysis of the geographical expansion of surveillance systems, but rather an examination of different dimensions of space. In the following sections I discuss the conceptualization of space and try to come to a clearer understanding of the various dimensions of space that is under surveillance.

III Conceptualizations of space

For a long time geographers have used concepts of space to understand the complexity of the social world (e.g., Harvey, 1973; Lefebvre, 1991; Rose, 1993; Massey, 1994; Soja, 1996; to name but a few). Different forms of spatiality have been crucial in explaining multiple social problems and phenomena, from the circulation of capital to gendered power relations. In addition, the concept of space as derived from Foucault (e.g., 1977; 1980; 1986a) is understood as a fundamental basis for the exercise of power. In this article my aim is to explain how surveilled space is formed and how it relates to power structures and human emotions. In order to understand the spaces produced through surveillance, it is essential first to explore the various conceptualizations of space.

Many conceptualizations of space have focused on the difference between material physical space and social space – the distinction between 'real' and 'imagined' space (Soja, 1996). Lefebvre's theories can, however, be seen as an attempt to integrate these dimensions and so to conceptualize space as simultaneously physical, mental and social (Madanipour, 1996: 341), or 'real-and-imagined', as Soja (1996) has subsequently suggested. Lefebvre (1991: 38–39) understood space as the *perceived space* of daily routine, the *conceived space* as understood by experts and professional practices, and the *lived space* as associated with experience and nonverbal symbols. His theory has been a source of inspiration for numerous researchers (Liggett, 1995; Madanipour, 1996; Simonsen, 1996; Soja, 1989, 1996; among others) who have attempted to understand the comprehensive spatiality of social life. Others have focused on spatiality in specific contexts.

My aim here is not to construct an ambitious meta-theory of space but rather, to

understand the particular phenomenon of video-surveillance in relation to space. As has been argued, there is no purpose in developing a 'great narrative of spatiality' (Strassoldo, 1993). Attempts to create a complete theory often end up either as too general or as postulating extreme oppositions in order to explain real phenomena; according to Domosh (1998: 210) 'by creating a framework of opposing positions, theorists set up two extreme positions that cannot adequately describe the complexities of real life'. My object here is to develop an understanding of space that is intimately bound to the issue in question. Hence I aim to use space concepts as 'tools' for discussing the questions raised by surveillance.

Surveillance is changing the nature of space or, in fact, is producing a new kind of space. This change can be understood in three ways: *space as a container*, *power-space* and *emotional space*. Although these concepts are discussed separately in the following sections, they are partly overlapping, not mutually exclusive, dimensions of space – they are present simultaneously in a city that is under surveillance. While the arguments presented here are not directly based on any previous spatial concepts, they are based on the traditions of spatial understanding. The concepts described here do not differentiate between physical, mental and social space – they are *all* deeply social. However, this does not mean that physical space is ignored. The aim is to focus on both social space and physical space, but on physical space as it is embedded in social meanings and uses.

There is a long tradition of elaborating *three* concepts of space (e.g., Harvey, 1973; Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 1996). Within this tradition there is a common thread: the 'third' space is regarded implicitly as the newest, the most 'intelligent; and therefore the 'best' space. Sometimes one even gets the impression that the first two spaces are described in detail simply to create a yardstick against which the third, 'right' space might be measured to its advantage. Although my analysis of surveillance is based on three dimensions of space, my aim is not to postulate three concepts of which one is the most useful. Rather, I wish to emphasize the complicated and multifaceted nature of space and to stress how these concepts of space simultaneously affect the dimensions of human spatiality.

IV Space as a container: locations that matter

Space is a container in which social interaction takes place. However, in much geographical thought this conceptualization of space has not been emphasized: rather, it is often suggested that space is not *just* a container but that many processes (production, consumption, power structures, etc.) come together to shape and create it (e.g., Harvey, 1973; Lefebvre, 1991; Massey, 1994). While generally agreeing with this, I would still like to argue that it is useful to consider space as a container. It *does* matter what kind of physical (architectural) frames space offers for social interaction, where objects in space lie (both vertically and horizontally) and how things are located in relation to each other. In this section I discuss how the spatiality of video-surveillance can be regarded as a container and the insights this conception may or may not provide. For example, what kind of frames does video-surveillance provide for social interaction? Do the locations of different objects and persons matter and, if so, to what extent?

'Space as a container' is a passive space. Built forms have been created by and for

human beings, and they can function as restrictions or possibilities. While the concept of space is certainly never simply an architectural conception, it is at the same time easy to underestimate the role of physical structures. Architecture is not just a matter of style and image; architecture also promotes or prevents encounter (Newman, 1972). Similarly, space as container is not simply a physical construct – it is also constituted through the locations of people and of groups of people in relation one to another.

1 The hidden behind the visible

For several reasons, for people under surveillance, I would argue, space as a container can be disorientating and alienating. First, what causes most mistrust about the technical ability of a camera is that a camera mainly operates backwards: it is designed to solve crime rather than to prevent it. However, the benefits of surveillance should lie in its ability to *respond* to a crime (Oc and Tiesdell, 1997: 138) but, for a victim of violence, the help proffered by a camera may come too late. In the case of an attack, it might be possible to use the videotape to catch the offender(s), and to use the tape as evidence in court, but this response would not erase the actual experience of violence. This is a particularly serious drawback in relation to sexual violence. The prevention of sexual assault is of much greater importance than any reaction to it, and women have clearly indicated that this inability is a crucial reason for their mistrust of video-surveillance (Koskela, 2000).

Secondly, even if the camera seems to look down from above, *the camera itself has no eyes*. Its lens is blind unless someone is looking through it. Similarly, a camera's location gives no indication of where the people behind the camera are situated. There is no personal contact between the security personnel and the public. One does not know whether anyone is looking and, if so, who that person is or how far away he or she is. One does not even know whether that person is *above* or *below*. Surveillance cameras have been considered as being 'literally above' (Fyfe and Bannister, 1998): they survey from 'above the crowd', 'from up there'. But quite often this is not the case. The camera seems to be looking at people from above but the monitoring room may be, for example, in the basement of a shopping mall where premises are cheaper (Koskela, 1995). This makes it very difficult to ask for help through the agency of the camera – the camera *leaves its object entirely as an object*: passive, without any ability to influence the situation.

2 Paradoxes in architectural form

Disorientation and alienation can also be created through architectural design. It has been claimed that architecture can reduce a building's obviousness of purpose and that it is becoming more and more difficult to 'navigate' in the urban environment (Jameson, 1991). In the past, buildings representing power and authority were imposing and showy, often built on high, clearly visible sites, and their entrances were emphasized. By contrast, in contemporary architecture, power is hidden and unnoticeable, and authority is represented not through its visibility but rather through its invisibility (Foucault, 1977). Entrances and routes are hidden and are known only to – and hence are only supposed to be found by – exceptional privileged people (Eräsaari, 1995). This

is most obvious in the spaces of surveillance, which are 'stealthy and slippery': impossible to find and reach (Flusty, 1994). While anyone can see the cameras (Fyfe and Bannister, 1996: 39), the hidden locations of the control rooms makes it impossible for the public to see from where they are being observed.

Spatially segregated American cities frequently serve as models of postmodern design against which the architecture of other cities is measured: indeed, it has been pointed out that the American model of urban form and of urban futures seems to dominate academic discussion in an often uncritical way (Charlesworth and Cochrane, 1997; Lees, 1998). Comparable changes in architectural design and in surveillance techniques have happened elsewhere. For example, on the streets of London and in most other cities in Britain, clearly visible surveillance cameras are everywhere but it is almost impossible to know which ones belong to private companies and which ones are publicly maintained and might be accessible to the police. In some metro stations in Helsinki, the mirrors on the wall are windows through which the guards can see the public. Few people know this, and, even if they do, it is impossible to tell whether there is someone inside or not. Urban space is hence becoming less predictable.

What is characteristic of surveillance design is its paradoxicality: forms are at the same time transparent and opaque. While everything (and everyone) under surveillance is becoming more visible, the forces (and potential helpers) behind this surveillance are becoming less so. Forms are transparent from one side and opaque from the other – such as the mirror-like windows in Helsinki metro stations. Although the purpose of surveillance is supposed to be an increase in safety, its design is rather, producing uncertainty. Again, this leaves the public as passive subjects in a container: they are subjects in a position of not knowing their own being.

3 The image displaces reality

Just as the cameras and architectural forms of surveillance disturb the public, they are also disorientating and alienating to the people behind them – the police and guards. Such people have less personal contact with the public in the street. Compared to social control characterized by encounters with people, control accomplished through surveillance is faceless. The two-dimensional space in the surveillance monitors is the daily (and nightly) 'working environment' of security personnel. It is 'easy police work' (Channel 4, 1993) but the humane side of surveillance is lacking. The use of video-surveillance can arguably be said to effect the ways in which 'reality' is conceptualized and understood.³ By being positioned behind a surveillance camera (where the world is seen on a TV screen) one can be tempted to believe that what is seen on the screen is real. However, this is only a restricted image of reality. It is reality seen from a particular viewpoint that has a certain ability to pan or zoom in – an image reduced to the visual.⁴

What I wish to argue here is that surveillance actually *makes* space a container. The alienated who look from behind the camera see the space under surveillance through the monitor (simplified to two dimensions) and they look at people as if they were objects. The very absence of direct personal contact and the fact that the overseers are not themselves in the monitored space make them see the space from the outside. In the monitoring room, the two-dimensional 'virtual' space becomes more authentic than the three-dimensional reality outside. The people under surveillance (the objects looked at)

are seen as if they were bodies moving around in a container: 'anonymity becomes the norm' (Hannah, 1997a: 174). People are reduced to doll-like bodies lacking personal qualities, and surveillance is reduced to the observation of bodily movements. The technical equipment that separates the two sides of surveillance makes it difficult for the space to be recognized as a lived, experienced space.

This particular technologization of space is affecting the nature of space: space is regarded as if it were merely a passive container where the watched objects exist. It is insensitive to who comes and goes and to what his or her feelings or intentions might be – as long as he or she seems to have no intentions to commit (a visually recognizable) crime. Furthermore, the space under surveillance is always confined. This space is 'perceived as potentially emptiable' (Herbert, 1996b: 568). It is a *stage-like* space one can enter and exit and, while one is in it, one is seen as an inactive object of surveillance.

This space can be understood in traditional, but out of fashion, geographical terms. It is *clinical, objectified space*: a condition where the city (of a part of it) is seen as a laboratory of human behaviour. In this space people are reduced to socially inactive producers of bodily movements and analysed as if looked at from above. The aerial photographs at different scales reproduced uncritically in many old geography textbooks exemplify this kind of space very well. It is an 'abstract visualization' of space (cf. Madanipour, 1996). In order to understand human spatiality it is, of course, important to recognize that this is not all that space entails. While my purpose here is not to promulgate this conception of space, current technological developments in surveillance are, in fact, producing this kind of space. In the process of surveillance space is forced *to be* 'a container'. If we deny this, we may be unable to understand what happens in contemporary cities.

V Power-space: to look or to be looked at

Foucault's work shows that space has a crucial role in the exercise of power: there is a reciprocal relationship between power and space.⁵ More specifically, it is not only the structures of space – the spatial forms – that matter, but also the social processes that are bound to the production of space. As a number of authors have pointed out, the panopticon-like nature of city surveillance has interesting and important parallels with Foucault's ideas (Cohen, 1985; Fyfe and Bannister, 1996; Herbert, 1996a; Soja, 1996; Hannah, 1997b; Ainley, 1998). A city, like the panopticon, can be seen as a 'laboratory of power' (Foucault, 1977: 204), 'both a graphic model and a metaphor for strategic social controls' (Faith, 1994: 56). In both cases surveillance 'links knowledge, power and space' (Herbert, 1996a: 49). In cities, the routine of surveillance makes the exercise of power almost instinctive: people are controlled, categorized, disciplined and normalized without any particular reason. With respect to surveillance, urban space can be conceptualized as 'power-space': a space impregnated with disciplinary practices.

The power-space of surveillance is constantly shaped and changed by social power relationships. Obviously, the purpose of surveillance cameras is to exercise power: to control deviant behaviour, to reduce crime and to keep a space secure. However, this ostensible control engenders other forms of power, either intended or unintended. The politics of seeing, and of being seen, are complex: who has the right to look and whom will be looked at? What, in a particular context, is regarded as deviant? Who owns the

space under surveillance? What kinds of power relation and structures shape the space under surveillance, and how? Could there be a gender dimension?

1 Cities versus the panopticon

Foucault (1980: 148) describes the panopticon as ‘a technology of power designed to solve the problems of surveillance’. Clearly, surveillance cameras are the same: a technological solution designed to solve the problems of surveillance in urban space. However, we are undoubtedly talking about two separate things here: a city is a city and a prison is a prison. How much are they alike, or is their similarity just a rhetorical trick?

Indeed, there are important differences between this ‘ideal prison’ and urban space, and their similarities should not be ‘overdrawn’ (Fyfe and Bannister, 1996: 39). First, people in cities are not imprisoned but can (at least in principle) move about freely and they are entitled to leave. They do not ‘suffer continuous confinement’ (Hannah, 1997b: 344). Urban space is not a space of coercion in the same sense as a prison, since being in urban space is voluntary. Nevertheless, if one wanted to avoid coming under surveillance it would be impossible to live in a city. Secondly, a city is not punishment. Rather, it can be seen as a potential, a space of manifold activity, leisure and lust. Thirdly, people in cities are not isolated – quite the opposite: a city is a space of endless encounters. Fourthly, a city is full of diversity. The diversity of both spaces and social practices makes it impossible to consider urban space, simply and directly, as comparable to the panopticon: ‘Too much happens in the city for this to be true’, as Soja (1996: 235) points out. The objects and perpetrators of the gaze are not always clear in an urban environment: shops, for example, use cameras to monitor their own personnel as well as customers (Takala, 1998). Furthermore, what is considered to be an appropriate manner in a particular time and place varies according to gender, age, etc. Fifthly, whereas imprisonment as punishment is part of an established legal system (Driver, 1985), the forces that maintain urban discipline are not exclusively extensions of the state. Cameras operated by the private sector outnumber those used by the authorities. On the surface, increased surveillance can easily be misconstrued as increased power on the part of the authorities but, in fact, the situation can be quite the opposite: the authorities have very little control over how and where surveillance is used. This means that the power-relations concerning surveillance are very complex.

Although it is important to acknowledge these differences, there are several characteristics of the mechanism of the panopticon that are clearly inherent in the surveillance of contemporary cities, and these are worth specifying. The significance of *visibility* is perhaps the most obvious and most often acknowledged panoptic principle (e.g., Cohen, 1985; Soja, 1989; Hillier, 1996; Hannah, 1997a; Fyfe and Bannister, 1998). The exercise of disciplinary power ‘involves regulation through visibility’ (Hannah, 1997a: 171). The ability to see affords the basic condition for collecting knowledge and for being in control. The panopticon embodies the power of the visual: ‘[T]he major effect of the panopticon’ is, in Foucault’s (1977: 201) words, ‘to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.’ As the prisoner is visible, so are the signs of control since the prisoners will always be able to see the tower from which they are watched. Accordingly, citizens in urban space will

see surveillance cameras positioned in visible places, and this will constantly remind them of their own visibility. A doubled experience of visibility results: 'I see, so I will be seen.'

However, not all cameras are positioned where they can be seen: *unverifiability* is as crucial for maintaining power as visibility. In the panoptic prison, 'the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at at any moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so' (Foucault, 1977: 201). Watching remains 'sporadic', but 'the threat of being watched never ceases' (Hannah, 1997b: 347). Accordingly, unverifiability means that, even if one sees the cameras, one can never know whether there really is someone behind them. The camera works as a reminder of possible scrutiny, as a 'deterrent' (Oc and Tiesdell, 1997). This perhaps ensures discipline but, at the same time, it erodes confidence. The very notion that 'you never know' is one of the most important reasons for mistrust of electronic surveillance (Trench *et al.*, 1992; Koskela, 2000).

Anonymity is another similarity. Like the inmate of the panoptic prison, the public in urban space are often unaware of who is responsible for the surveillance. Moreover, the control of surveillance is independent of who is responsible for the surveillance. It does not matter who is controlling it: 'it could be a computer' (Cohen, 1985: 221). Hence, anonymity is another common reason for mistrust. While an official aim of surveillance is to increase safety, if the public do not know who is watching them and from where, the effect will be feelings of being *unsafe*. It is thus not surprising that urban authorities experience ever-increasing difficulties in 'maintaining credibility' (Hannah, 1997a: 175; see also Mitchell, 1995; Oc and Tiesdell, 1997). Furthermore, the panoptic nature of surveillance implies the anonymity of the power itself. Power is present, it is exercised, but no one possesses it: '[i]t exists only in actions' (Grosz, 1990: 87). The guards are mere mediators of power, tied to the same process as the public – simultaneously exercising and being subjected to power.

Although it has been argued that the 'militarization' of urban space is increasing (Davis, 1990; Dear and Flusty, 1998), it is also the case that *absence of force* (Cohen, 1985) is one of the panoptic principles currently present in cities. Panoptic surveillance ensures there is no need for physical intervention. As Foucault (1980: 155) puts it: 'There is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze.' Being constantly aware of being controlled by invisible overseers leads to the *internalization of control*. While the panopticon ostensibly keeps the body entrapped, it is in fact targeted at the psyche: in this mechanism 'the soul is the prison of the body' (Foucault, 1977: 30). People regulate their own behaviour even when this is not necessary, and they exercise power over themselves. An individual 'becomes the principle of his own subjection' (Foucault, 1977: 203). Power operates by creating 'bad conscience' (Lash, 1990: 58, quoted in Faith, 1994: 59). The panoptic condition of video-surveillance imposes self-vigilance. Internalization of control means 'easy and effective exercise of power' (Foucault, 1980: 148). This is exactly the political argument used to support the installation of new cameras and to defend the expansion of electronic surveillance: it is claimed to be easy and effective.

Additional panoptic principles that are clearly present in urban space are *normalization* and *permanent documentation*. The routine surveillance of city centres or malls ensures exclusion of deviance and 'the maintenance of normality among the already normal' (Hannah, 1997b: 349). Surveillance aims to 'normalize' urban space. It multiplies the effect of 'social norms' which contribute to controlling behaviour (cf.

Domosh, 1998). As Foucault (1977: 189) has argued, an important dimension of the penal system the panopticon was part of was 'a system of intense registration and of documentary accumulation.' What was crucial to the panopticon was 'the connection between bodies, space, power, and knowledge' (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 192). Although contemporary surveillance systems are not all-inclusive in gathering knowledge, there are several overlapping registration systems that work from public urban space to cyberspace so that the everyday life of an individual includes more registration than ever before (see Lyon, 1994; Curry, 1997; Hannah, 1997b; Fyfe *et al.*, 1998; Graham, 1998). The control of activity, time and space is intense.

Finally, both in the panopticon and in the power-space of surveillance, *social contact* is – most often – *reduced to the visual*. While visibility has a very important role in surveillance, it also overpowers the other senses: there is nothing more than that which meets the eye. This has several interesting consequences. Conceptually, the question of the dominance of visibility is part of a wider critique that considers the often-concealed *gendered* ideologies in geography (Rose, 1993; Nash, 1996; Nast and Kobayashi, 1996: among others). Since there is no room here to provide a review of this discussion, I shall concentrate on the more practical meanings of visibility in relation to surveillance and space. However, as I go on to argue in the next section, visibility is not without a gender dimension, even in its most tangible forms.

2 A gender dimension?

In feminist geography there has been a long debate about gender and space, and a great deal of work has been done to show that 'spatiality cannot be analysed solely through the medium of a male body and heterosexual male experience' (Massey, 1994: 182). By its essence, space is gendered: the very existence of male violence, for example, modifies women's interpretations of space. What does this mean in relation to video-surveillance? Could gender be of importance in the space under surveillance? Is it the case that women in particular are likely enjoy the 'pay off' (Honest and Charman, 1992: 11) of surveillance? How is 'the visual' gendered here?

It is not the intention of this section to argue that gender relations are understood as the only dimensions through which power is exercised.⁶ Gender is seen, rather, as one example of the many forms of power and repression associated with surveillance. However, by focusing on gender relations negotiated under surveillance, it might also be possible to understand more about other forms of power and exclusion. First, I examine the gender relations of surveillance at their simplest level: who occupies the opposite sides of a surveillance camera? If we looked at the places and spaces under surveillance, and the maintenance of surveillance, would we see practices that could be gendered?

In public and semi-public space, the places where surveillance most often occurs are, as mentioned above, the shopping malls and the shopping areas of city centres and, likewise, areas of public transport (such as underground stations, railway stations and busy bus stops). The people who usually negotiate and decide upon surveillance are the management: managers of shopping malls, leading politicians, city mayors, etc. Furthermore, the people who maintain surveillance are the police and private guards. From this it is possible to draw some conclusions about the gender structure of surveil-

lance. Women spend more time shopping than men, and everyday purchases are mostly bought by women (Reeves, 1996: 138). The majority of the users of public transport are women (Hill, 1996; Kaartokallio, 1997). Thus women quite often occupy the typical places of surveillance. By contrast, those in charge of deciding on surveillance are usually men. More importantly, those who maintain surveillance (the police and guards) are also mostly men. Thus, *at the simplest level*, surveillance is, indeed, gendered: most of the people 'behind' the cameras are men and most of the people 'under' surveillance are women.

However, there are other, more complicated features, of this gender structure. In the world of surveillance the 'masculine culture' of technology (Wajcman, 1991) is reproduced in the masculine interiors of monitoring rooms as well as in the recruitment of guards for their physical strength and for their tall, muscular appearance rather than suitable schooling or their ability to cope with people. The 'cop culture' (e.g., Fyfe, 1995) is producing mistrust of surveillance: women do not rely on those behind the cameras because the guards and the police responsible for the daily routine of surveillance reproduce patriarchal forms of power. Surveillance is interpreted as part of 'male policing in the boardest sense' (Brown, 1998: 217). To understand the ways in which the power-space of surveillance is gendered, we need to specify the dimensions of the visual – of 'the gaze'.

3 The gaze and the politics of looking

As has already been argued, since video-surveillance usually reduces everything to the visual, it is unable to identify situations where more sensitive interpretation is needed. For example, surveillance overseers can easily observe clearly visible but otherwise minor offences while ignoring situations they might regard as ambivalent, such as (verbal) sexual harassment (Koskela, 2000). Most cameras are unable to interpret threatening situations that are not visually recognizable, and therefore cases of harassment often go unnoticed. Sexual harassment is more difficult to identify, and to interrupt, by surveillance camera than by the police/guards patrolling on foot. This insensitivity of the cameras – i.e., restriction within the field of vision – is an important reason for doubt and disorientation. 'The gaze' becomes gendered.⁷

This failure could be understood as a 'passive' relationship between surveillance and harassment, but there is more to surveillance than this. There is a dimension that could be understood as an 'active' relationship between surveillance and harassment. By this I mean it is possible to use surveillance cameras as a means of harassment. There is some voyeuristic fascination in looking, in being able to see. And scrutiny is a common and effective form of harassment (Gardner, 1995). In urban space women are the ones likely to be looked at – the objects of the gaze (Massey, 1994: 234).⁸ Furthermore, one of the very reasons for women's insecurity is their 'exaggerated visibility' (Brown, 1998: 218). Paradoxically, women are marginalized by being at the centre (of the looks) (cf. Rose, 1993). As used by an abuser, a 'look' can be as effective a weapon as physical violence: '[p]ower and the gaze are always linked in the mind of the intimidated' (MacCannell and MacCannell, 1993: 215). Looking connotes power, and being looked at powerlessness. Harassment makes the gaze reproduce the embodiment and sexualization of women.

Although there is not a great deal of published research on the gendered aspects of surveillance, the points made here can be supported by empirical evidence. It has been shown that there is public concern about the 'potential 'Peeping Tom' element' (Honest and Charman, 1992: 9), that women are worried about possible 'voyeurism' (Trench, 1997: 149; Brown, 1998: 218), and that cameras positioned in places of an intimate nature irritate women (Koskela, 2000). In addition, there is anecdotal evidence of the camera abuse. Hillier (1996: 99–100) describes the case of Burswood Casino in Australia, where the security camera operators had videotaped women in toilets and artists' changing rooms, zooming in on the exposed parts of their bodies and editing the video sequences on to one tape that was shown at local house parties. In like manner, in the summer of 1997 it was discovered that Swedish conscript soldiers had been 'entertaining' themselves by monitoring topless women on a beach near their navy base, taping the women and printing pictures of them to hang on the barrack walls (*Helsingin Sanomat*, 17 December 1997). The cameras used were of extremely high quality and, hence, the pictures were quite explicit. These cases (the latter now being investigated as a crime) are glaring examples of the possibility of the masculinization and militarization of space, of the gendering of surveillance and of the abuse of control.

Furthermore, surveillance does not replace or erase other forms of embodiment: women still encounter sexual harassment and objectifying attitudes in their face-to-face contacts in urban space. Surveillance might be a way of reproducing and reinforcing male power. It is 'opening up new possibilities for harassment' (Ainley, 1998: 92). Surveillance can be understood as the 're-embodiment' of women, as 'an extension of male gaze'. It has been suggested that more knowledge is needed about 'how disciplinary power operates in connection with other tools of class and gender oppression' (Hannah, 1997a: 179). Arguably, the practice of surveillance could contribute to perpetuating the existing imbalance in gender relations, rather than challenging it. The power-space is gendered.

4 Power, space and 'power-space'

Whereas bodies in 'space as a container' were doll-like and lacking any personal qualities, bodies in power-space are different. These bodies have gender, age, race, colour of skin and sexuality. They have different understandings of their relations to society; some are strong, others are marginalized and threatened. The condition of being under surveillance, accordingly, can make people react in different ways: those in apparent positions of power may understand it differently from those 'on the margins'. By definition, the camera must have two sides: those behind the camera and those under surveillance. Consequently, surveillance is inevitably a matter of power: it does not offer a neutral space. This again underlines the intimate relationship between space and power.

Nevertheless, both Foucault himself and those who have pursued his ideas have emphasized the 'spatialization of power' rather than how power affects the nature of space. Similarly, geographers have commented on Foucault in quite general terms, such as suggesting that he develops a 'spatially sensitive analysis' (Herbert, 1996a: 48), or that his work is 'foundational to spatial theory' (Liggett and Perry, 1995: 6). But the *concept of space itself* remains vague.

Although undoubtedly a careful reading of Foucault might reveal insights regarding the social production of space (as, for example, the works of Philo (1992), Gregory (1994) and Soja (1989, 1996) show), in most of his work the notion of space is treated as physical, architectural space (Foucault, 1977; 1980; 1986a).⁹ In fact, Foucault never attempted a detailed, self-conscious or systematic conceptualization of space (Philo, 1992: 140; Soja, 1996: 147). Whereas he considered many other concepts, such as ‘power’ or ‘knowledge’, ‘space’ was often taken almost for granted.¹⁰ It was the organization of architectural space that was, in particular, the focus of interest – a space that made it possible to ‘separate’, ‘distribute’, ‘rank’ and ‘observe’ people – actions that are all crucial to the exercise of power (Foucault, 1977; Driver, 1985). However, if space is considered to be a social product, the nature of space itself deserves more attention. The relationship between power and space changes: not only is space crucial to the exercise of power but, reciprocally, *power also creates a particular kind of space*.

Since Foucault’s analysis was on ‘clearly defined, segregated institutional spaces’ (Fyfe and Bannister, 1996: 39) – such as prisons, hospitals and schools – diversity or change in the nature of space were apparently not central to his thoughts. However, in relation to urban space under surveillance, the social (and changing) nature of space is precisely what matters. The complex power-related social practices of surveillance produce (a particular kind of) space. They produce ‘power-space’.

VI Emotional space: the ambivalent experience

Power-space is an important concept in understanding how surveillance affects people, but is it unable to explain another equally important dimension: surveillance as an emotional experience. While I do not wish to claim that emotions and feelings are unconnected to social power-relations, being committed to the feminist notion of identities being constructed through and by power relations, I want to argue that power and emotions are fundamentally intertwined.¹¹ It is crucial to understand space through individual emotional experience, which is related to, but not exactly the same as, the space as conceptualized by power-relations. As social (power)relations, emotions produce space; thus space can be understood as ‘emotional space’.

From the experiential point of view, both concepts of space outlined in previous sections remain ‘spaces from above’, distanced from ‘everyday spaces’ (Rose, 1993) and ‘the practices of everyday life’ (de Certeau, 1984). Although some notions (such as lack of credibility) imply lived, experienced space, the concepts ‘space as a container’ and ‘power-space’ emphasize space as seen from the perspective of ‘those who control’. They remain ‘external viewpoints’ (cf. Gregory, 1994: 300). The reason for using emotional space as my last tool is to provide a perspective on those who are under surveillance and who *are being watched*. Emotional space is a space ‘below the threshold at which visibility begins’ (de Certeau, 1984: 93, quoted in Gregory, 1994: 301).

Emotionally, there is a big difference between being looked at by someone directly and being looked at through the lens of a surveillance camera. The variety of feelings surveillance evokes is enormous: those being watched may feel guilty for no reason, embarrassed or uneasy, irritated or angry, or fearful; they may also feel secure and safe (Koskela, 2000). Quite often people’s feelings are ambivalent. Surveillance can evoke simultaneously positive and negative feelings: on the one hand, surveillance cameras

increase security but, on the other, they induce feelings of mistrust. Is this contradiction irrational? How might people feel simultaneously more secure and more fearful?

1 Undervalued emotions

Traditionally, 'the emotional' has often been regarded as the less valuable end of the rational-emotional dichotomy (Rose, 1993). It has been regarded as 'the feminine' (based on an essentialistic notion of femininity) and 'the undervalued'. Emotions are often considered as taken for granted, not worthy of conceptual examination (Abu-Lughod and Lutz, 1990). Moreover, they have been considered as being entirely subjective, and no attempt has been made to understand their connections to wider, often extremely crucial, social processes. However, it is important that we understand the broader structures in which emotions are embedded. Whereas emotions themselves are subjective, 'emotional space' is social.

While the work of Foucault was an important impetus for understanding the first two concepts of space described above, emotional space is somewhat different. Foucault's work did not include the personal experiences or feelings of those being watched (Cain, 1993). The dichotomy between reason and emotion remained unquestioned (Ransom, 1993: 137). It has been argued that Foucault's work aims to 'get rid of the subject itself' (Balbus, 1987: 116) and to emphasize disciplinary mechanisms and the social body. The 'subject' was seen mainly as an outcome of disciplinary power/knowledge: 'subjects become obliterated or are recreated as passive objects' (Hartsock, 1990: 167). Hence his work would not help in trying to understand emotions.

2 Meaningful contradictions

Emotional space is different from conventional concepts of space. However, what comes close to this concept in that it takes emotions seriously is the concept of 'paradoxical space' (Rose, 1993), which has its origins in contemporary feminist thought. In paradoxical space, Rose (1993: 140) argues, 'the spaces that would be mutually exclusive if charted on a two-dimensional map, are occupied simultaneously'. This idea facilitates our understanding of the contradictions that seem so inevitable from the perspective of everyday life, but that remain so untouchable in most scientific discourse.

The very experience of being under surveillance is ambivalent. Whatever form of surveillance is investigated – crime prevention, collection of evidence, invasion of privacy, etc. – this appears to be the case (Koskela, 2000). Even if we can work out, for example, how potential criminals would react if watched (and that video-surveillance is guaranteeing our better security) this does not mean we would feel more safe. For a lone woman in an underground station subject to surveillance by a camera, the camera (as an object) could represent threat more than security or, even more interestingly, threat *as well as* security. The very same object that is reminding her of (male) power is, at the same time, supposed to protect her from male (power). In such circumstances, internal negotiation is not easy.

Although one of the aims of surveillance is to increase people's feelings of security, being the object of surveillance does not necessarily *encourage* feelings of safety. Feelings

of vulnerability are related to lack of control (Smith, 1986). To be controlled by a surveillance camera – to be ‘under control’ – does not increase one’s feeling of being ‘in control’. This can perhaps be explained by comparing a surveillance camera to another familiar object: a public telephone. A public telephone in a corridor may make one feel safer than a surveillance camera even if one understood that, if something violent were to happen, it would be much more likely that the people behind the camera would interfere, rather than someone on the other end of the pay-phone (Koskela, 1995). This feeling emanates because, in relation to the telephone, one feels ‘a subject’ and thus able to control the situation whereas, in relation to the camera, one is always ‘an object’. The object of a camera is in the situation of being a *potential victim*, without the opportunity to influence his or her own destiny. The object is forced to trust in someone else. This is why surveillance raises contradictions: to be placed in the position of a victim does not increase the feeling of being ‘in control’, but rather the feeling of being ‘under control’. However, while feelings of being under control may not be pleasant, they might still ensure one’s feelings of safety.

Emotional space may be difficult to understand because it cannot be described in static terms; it evades definitions and remains ‘untouchable’. However, emotions such as fear of violence do, arguably, shape one’s interpretation of space: the streets of fear are different in length according to the time of the day, who is passing by, how confident one feels at that moment, etc. (Koskela, 1997: 315). Emotional space is ‘elastic’. It is like a liquid – its nature changes according to where one is, what one does, who one is with, etc. It feels like one thing but then, all of a sudden, it changes to something else. Moreover, emotional space is essentially ambivalent. It is not logical but internally contradictory by nature. *There is no clear dynamic of power and resistance*. Space can feel oppressive: ‘like an enemy itself’ (Rose, 1993: 143), but reclaiming space can – at the same time – be the precondition for emancipation. Being in space is difficult (Rose, 1993: 143) but obligatory.

It is not impossible to appreciate that contradictions in one’s feelings and emotions can, in the sense, make sense. For example, intuition and learnt knowledge can be contradictory, but one’s feelings are often based on both processes (Koskela, 1997: 304). Feelings can be disapproving but still sound. Their origins may seem irrational, and their essence may be internally contradictory, but the resulting reactions may be understandable. They are not a mathematical function of actual risks but the complicated products of personal experience and memory. In the context of emotional space, the practical issue of video-surveillance is not something one can either oppose or support: it is far more complex. To be under surveillance is an ambivalent emotional event. A surveillance camera, as an object, can at the same time represent safety and danger. To be protected can feel the same as being threatened. A paradox of emotional space is that it does, indeed, make sense that surveillance cameras can make people feel both more secure and more fearful.

VII Conclusions

A surveillance camera is an enigmatic object: it has no eyes but it has the ‘gaze’. Even though people under surveillance are well aware of the fact that the camera itself cannot see (and thus they do not trust the camera), they are at the same time aware that

someone sees, or might see, through it. Although at a particular moment people are aware that someone may or may not be looking at them, they are aware of the gaze, and this gaze is (partly) unrelated to the act of looking. The gaze is always where the camera is.

In this article I have discussed the variety of implications 'the gaze' of a surveillance camera has for space. The three concepts of space used here as tools of analysis have revealed differing but equally important aspects of surveillance. In relation to surveillance, some ostensibly innocent issues assume great importance. The location of things and information about locations are essential for credibility but, as I have argued, credibility remains vague and, in many ways, a fragile concept. Similarly, location and design contribute to determining whether surveillance works to 'open' space or to 'close' it, whether surveillance increases accessibility or only produces restrictions and exclusions.

The gaze is also a matter of power. In present urban space, the obsession with visibility is persistent. By increasing surveillance '[a] dream of a transparent society' (Foucault, 1980: 152), a society where everything is subjugated to visual control, has almost been realized. The question here is not about 'crime control' but rather about 'control' in a wider sense. What makes visibility so important is 'fear of darkened spaces' which are 'zones of disorder' (Foucault, 1980: 153) that are not to be tolerated since they constitute a threat. Visibility ensures normalization and control. It produces 'purity' (Douglas, 1966). Visibility is cleanliness: 'light' equates with 'soap'. Surveillance has become a mechanism with the aims of guaranteeing purity and the exclusion of feared strangers: 'the Other' in a literal as well as metaphorical sense.

It is surprising how little critical discussion there has been of video-surveillance, given how long this development has been going on and how quickly it has expanded. A discussion on emotional space may offer one possible reason for this absence of critical discussion: the very ambivalent nature of its subjects. While we are used to discussing the dynamics of power and resistance (for which we are either for or against), it is difficult to discuss and argue about things of an ambivalent matter. There seems to be no tradition of discussing incongruent emotional subjects, but surely there is a need for such discussion.

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Notes

1. I have chosen not to use the term closed circuit television (CCTV). In my opinion this term reflects the technological terminology that is associated with surveillance. Such terminology may be

second nature to the experts behind the cameras but not to the general public. It is also an attempt to try to make the concepts I use understandable in two languages (English and Finnish), as there is no clear translation of CCTV in Finnish. I have thus decided to use the terms 'video-surveillance' and 'surveillance camera'. The abbreviations 'camera' and 'surveillance' are also used.

2. There is a need to be critical about the extent to which public spaces were ever public and the extent to which 'the death of public space' might be a largely rhetorical change. Domosh (1998: 209) argues that 'analyses of behaviour in the public spaces of nineteenth-century American cities suggest that these spaces too were often controlled by private interests, and were not necessarily any more democratic in the sense of tolerating deviant behaviour than are our postmodern "theme parks" '.

3. A comparable point has been made about the use of surveillance cameras and home videotapes on television: so-called 'real-life television' is producing a new genre of programmes where an unstable black-and-white videotape picture works as both symbol and guarantee of 'reality' (Salminen, 1997).

4. The amateur video of the beating of Rodney King is a good example of the controversial nature of interpretation. The jury ended up discussing whether those parts of a video which were 'out of focus' could be used as evidence or not (Channel 4, 1993).

5. My interpretations of Foucault are closely bound to the practical execution of surveillance. These arguments by no means reflect the whole body of his work but are restricted to those parts that most directly consider questions related to observation, scrutiny and surveillance (Foucault, 1977; 1980; 1986a).

6. Moreover, there are clear tensions between Foucault's power concept and feminist notions of power (see Hartsock, 1990; Ramazanoglu, 1993).

7. This is not to argue that harassment should only concern women: race, sexual orientation, age and other factors can also be a 'motive' for verbal harassment. The sexual harassment (of women) is one of a number of related problems.

8. Wilson (1991; 1995) has noted that this point is not to be simplified: women can be the perpetrators of, as well as the objects of, the gaze. Wilson (1995: 69) argues – importantly – against the reproduction of a condition in which 'women are stuck forever in the strait jacket of otherness by the Male Gaze'. Her remark, however, is not directed to a denial of the existence of sexual harassment.

9. A work that clearly differs is an article called 'On other spaces' (1986b; originally a lecture in 1967). This article provides a presentation of 'heterotopias' (for a profound analysis, see Soja, 1996), in which Foucault describes space in quite an exceptional way. He writes about the 'space of our dreams', 'internal' and 'external' space, and 'a space that can be flowing like sparkling water'. Unfortunately, this work was never published by Foucault himself and the concepts used were never developed further.

10. To illustrate this point, in a book Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) wrote on Foucault, the index includes most words crucial to Foucault's work – 'body', 'discourse', 'knowledge', 'language', 'power', 'sexuality', 'subject', etc. – but 'space' remains absent. The same applies to Ramazanoglu (1993).

11. This argument relates to the fundamental conceptual difference between 'humanistic geography' and 'feminist geography'. Whereas the former sees subjective emotions as an object of interest as such, the latter acknowledges their meaning in relation to social (gender) relations.

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